MDx-MAC and Building Fast MACs from Hash Functions

  • Bart Preneel
  • Paul C. van Oorschot
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 963)

Abstract

We consider the security of message authentication code (MAC) algorithms, and the construction of MACs from fast hash functions. A new forgery attack applicable to all iterated MAC algorithms is described, the first known such attack requiring fewer operations than exhaustive key search. Existing methods for constructing MACs from hash functions, including the secret prefix, secret suffix, and envelope methods, are shown to be unsatisfactory. Motivated by the absence of a secure, fast MAC algorithm not based on encryption, a new generic construction (MDx-MAC) is proposed for transforming any secure hash function of the MD4-family into a secure MAC of equal or smaller bitlength and comparable speed.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bart Preneel
    • 1
  • Paul C. van Oorschot
    • 2
  1. 1.Dept. Electrical Engineering-ESATKatholieke Universiteit LeuvenHeverleeBelgium
  2. 2.Bell-Northern ResearchOttawaCanada

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