Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results

  • Karine Gandolfi
  • Christophe Mourtel
  • Francis Olivier
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2162)

Abstract

Although the possibility of attacking smart-cards by analyzing their electromagnetic power radiation repeatedly appears in research papers, all accessible references evade the essence of reporting conclusive experiments where actual cryptographic algorithms such as des or rsa were successfully attacked.

This work describes electromagnetic experiments conducted on three different cmos chips, featuring different hardware protections and executing a des, an alleged COMP128 and an RSA. In all cases the complete key material was successfully retrieved.

Keywords

smart cards side channel leakage electromagnetic analysis SEMA DEMA DPA SPA 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Karine Gandolfi
    • 1
  • Christophe Mourtel
    • 1
  • Francis Olivier
    • 1
  1. 1.Card Security GroupGemplus Card InternationalGémenosFrance

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