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On the Exact Security of Full Domain Hash

  • Jean-Sébastien Coron
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1880)

Abstract

The Full Domain Hash (FDH) scheme is a RSA-based signature scheme in which the message is hashed onto the full domain of the RSA function. The FDH scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model, assuming that inverting RSA is hard. In this paper we exhibit a slightly di.erent proof which provides a tighter security reduction. This in turn improves the e.ciency of the scheme since smaller RSA moduli can be used for the same level of security. The same method can be used to obtain a tighter security reduction for Rabin signature scheme, Paillier signature scheme, and the Gennaro-Halevi-Rabin signature scheme.

Keywords

Hash Function Signature Scheme Random Oracle Random Oracle Model Signature Query 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jean-Sébastien Coron
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Ecole Normale SupérieureParisFrance
  2. 2.Gemplus Card InternationalIssy-les-MoulineauxFrance

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