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Dynamic Properties of Multiagents Based on a Mechanism of Loose Coalition

  • Takashi Katoh
  • Tetsuo Kinoshita
  • Norio Shiratori
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1881)

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a method of coalition formation for assigning tasks to appropriate agents to improve the efficiency of multiagent systems. To form a coalition, we introduce subjective information to agents, which are the internal information of the agents. The subjective information reflect the agents’ cooperative behavior of the past. Next, we introduce loose coalition, a concept of a coalition of agents based on the subjective information. Using the agents’ sense of values defined by their subjective information, each agent can give priority to the loose coalitions to ask for the working status or to assign tasks. Thus loose coalitions with higher priority will be better cooperating candidates. Furthermore, loose coalitions enable agents to collect information (e.g. busyness of loose coalitions) for task assignment efficiently. Therefore, the agents on the system can decide its behavior properly, depending on the current status of the system, and thus the efficiency of the system can be improved. Then, we observe dynamic properties of system under several settings of agents to derive a guideline for designing effective multiagent systems based on loose coalitions.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Takashi Katoh
    • 1
  • Tetsuo Kinoshita
    • 1
  • Norio Shiratori
    • 1
  1. 1.Research Institute of Electrical CommunicationTohoku UniversitySendaiJapan

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