Advertisement

Modeling a Virtual Food Court Using DECAF

  • Foster McGeary
  • Keith Decker
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1979)

Abstract

Since voluntary organizational decisions are most likely made by self-interested parties, organizational decisions in an economic market are subject to explanation by (at least) two different fields of study: organizational theory and microeconomics. This paper describes initial work on economic modeling, including the modeling of voluntary organizational contracts, of a set of business entities set in the market context of the food court at an upscale suburban mall, the Virtual Food Court. DECAF is an multi-agent toolkit that provides this effort with a GUI to easily establish the control mechanisms needed to express exchanges between participants and the operatingsy stem features to perform the message sendinga nd receivingtha t models the actual transactions. DECAF provides high-level language support and pre-built middle-agents for buildingm ulti-agent systems. This approach helps researchers or students get to the “interesting” parts of a simulation more quickly.

Keywords

Autonomous Agent Transaction Cost Economic Incoming Message Economic Entity Agent Initialization 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    K. S. Decker, K. Sycara, and M. Williamson. Middle‐agents for the internet. In Proceedings of the Fifteenth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 578–583, Nagoya, Japan, August 1997. 72, 75Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Keith S. Decker and Victor R. Lesser. Quantitative modeling of complex computational task environments. In Proceedings of the Eleventh National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 217–224, Washington, July 1993. 72Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Keith S. Decker and Katia Sycara. Intelligent adaptive information agents. Journal of Intelligent Information Systems, 9(3):239–260, 1997. 72CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Elihu M. Gerson. On ‘quality of life’. American Sociological Review, 41:793–806, 1976. 69CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    J. Graham and K. S. Decker. Towards a distributed, environment-centered agent framework. In Proceedings of the 1999 Intl. Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL-99), pages 162–175, 1999. 68Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    H. Mintzberg. The Structuring of Organizations. The Free Press, New York, 1979.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Charles Perrow. Complex Organizations. Random House, New York, 1986. 69Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Charles J. Petrie. Agent-based engineering, the web, and intelligence. IEEE Expert, December 1996.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    A. S. Rao and M. P. Georgeff. BDI agents: From theory to practice. In Proceedings of the First International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, pages 312–319, San Francisco, June 1995. AAAI Press. 73, 74Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Stuart Russell and Eric Wefald. Do the Right Thing: Studies in Limited Rationality. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991. 74Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    R. Simmons, R. Goodwin, K. Haigh, S. Koenig, and J O’sullivan. A layered architecture for office delivery robots. In Proceedings of the 1st Intl. Conf. on Autonomous Agents, pages 245–252, Marina del Rey, February 1997. 74Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Arthur L. Stinchcombe. Information and Organizations. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1990. 71Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    T. Wagner, A. Garvey, and V. Lesser. Complex goal criteria and its application in design-to-criteria scheduling. In Proceedings of the Fourteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Providence, July 1997. 72, 74Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Oliver E. Williamson. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. The Free Press, New York, 1975.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Oliver E. Williamson. The Mechanisms of Governance. Oxford University Press, New York, 1996.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Foster McGeary
    • 1
  • Keith Decker
    • 1
  1. 1.Computer and Information Sciences DepartmentUniversity of DelawareNewark

Personalised recommendations