Cooperation without Memory or Space: Tags, Groups and the Prisoner’s Dilemma

  • David Hales
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1979)

Abstract

A recent [14] model demonstrated that image scoring produces high cooperation between strangers in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). Here we outline a simpler approach in which players – which are either pure cooperators or defectors – can sustain cooperation with strangers by biasing game interactions towards others with the same tags (arbitrary bit strings representing “cultural markers” [11]). In our model there is no requirement for knowledge of past performance or recognition of individual players. Unlike spatial models [13] reproduction of strategies is population wide. Contrary to previous tag models [15] cooperation is demonstrated in the single round game.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Hales
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of EssexEssexUK

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