Cooperation without Memory or Space: Tags, Groups and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
A recent  model demonstrated that image scoring produces high cooperation between strangers in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD). Here we outline a simpler approach in which players – which are either pure cooperators or defectors – can sustain cooperation with strangers by biasing game interactions towards others with the same tags (arbitrary bit strings representing “cultural markers” ). In our model there is no requirement for knowledge of past performance or recognition of individual players. Unlike spatial models  reproduction of strategies is population wide. Contrary to previous tag models  cooperation is demonstrated in the single round game.
KeywordsMutual Cooperation Game Interaction High Cooperation Punishment Payoff Reciprocal Cooperation
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