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Using Second-Order Power Analysis to Attack DPA Resistant Software

  • Thomas S. Messerges
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1965)

Abstract

Under a simple power leakage model based on Hamming weight, a software implementation of a data-whitening routine is shown to be vulnerable to a first-order Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attack. This routine is modified to resist the first-order DPA attack, but is subsequently shown to be vulnerable to a second-order DPA attack. A second-order DPA attack that is optimal under certain assumptions is also proposed. Experimental results in an ST16 smartcard confirm the practicality of the first and second-order DPA attacks.

Keywords

Power Consumption Power Signal Differential Power Analysis Advanced Encryption Standard Algorithm Cryptographic Hardware 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Thomas S. Messerges
    • 1
  1. 1.Motorola LabsMotorolaSchaumburg

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