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Security of Signed ElGamal Encryption

  • Claus Peter Schnorr
  • Markus Jakobsson
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1976)

Abstract

Assuming a cryptographically strong cyclic group G of prime order q and a random hash function H, we show that ElGamal encryption with an added Schnorr signature is secure against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, in which an attacker can freely use a decryption oracle except for the target ciphertext. We also prove security against the novel one-more-decyption attack. Our security proofs are in a new model, corresponding to a combination of two previously introduced models, the Random Oracle model and the Generic model. The security extends to the distributed threshold version of the scheme. Moreover, we propose a very practical scheme for private information retrieval that is based on blind decryption of ElGamal ciphertexts.

Keywords

Group Element Generic Step Random Oracle Secret Data Security Proof 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Claus Peter Schnorr
    • 1
  • Markus Jakobsson
    • 2
  1. 1.Fachbereich Mathematik/InformatikUniversität FrankfurtGermany
  2. 2.Information Sciences LaboratoryBell Laboratories Murray HillNew Jersey

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