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Provable Security for the Skipjack-like Structure against Differential Cryptanalysis and Linear Cryptanalysis

  • Jaechul Sung
  • Sangjin Lee
  • Jongin Lim
  • Seokhie Hong
  • Sangjoon Park
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1976)

Abstract

In this paper we introduce a structure iterated by the rule A of Skipjack and show that this structure is provably resistant against differential or linear attacks. It is the main result of this paper that the upper bound of r-round (r ≥ 15) differential(or linear hull) probabilities are bounded by p 4 if the maximum differential (or linear hull) probability of a round function is p, and an impossible differential of this structure does not exist if r ≥ 16. Application of this structure which can be seen as a generalized Feistel structure in a way to block cipher designs brings out the provable security against differential and linear attacks with some upper bounds of probabilities. We also propose an interesting conjecture.

Keywords

Block Cipher Advance Encryption Standard Round Function Linear Hull Linear Cryptanalysis 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jaechul Sung
    • 1
  • Sangjin Lee
    • 1
  • Jongin Lim
    • 1
  • Seokhie Hong
    • 1
  • Sangjoon Park
    • 2
  1. 1.Center for Information and Security Technologies(CIST)Korea UniversitySeoulKOREA
  2. 2.National Security Research Institute(NSRI)TaejonKOREA

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