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The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm

  • Ronald L. Rivest
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 537)

Abstract

The MD4 message digest algorithm takes an input message of arbitrary length and produces an output 128-bit “fingerprint” or “message digest”, in such a way that it is (hopefully) computationally infeasible to produce two messages having the same message digest, or to produce any message having a given prespecified target message digest. The MD4 algorithm is thus ideal for digital signature applications: a large file can be securely “compressed” with MD4 before being signed with (say) the RSA public-key cryptosystem.

The MD4 algorithm is designed to be quite fast on 32-bit machines. For example, on a SUN Sparc station, MD4 runs at 1,450,000 bytes/second (11.6 Mbit/sec). In addition, the MD4 algorithm does not require any large substitution tables; the algorithm can be coded quite compactly.

The MD4 algorithm is being placed in the public domain for review and possible adoption as a standard.

Keywords

Hash Function User Authentication Scheme Digital Signature Scheme Secure Digital Signature Secure Digital Signature Scheme 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ronald L. Rivest
    • 1
  1. 1.Laboratory for Computer ScienceMassachusetts Institute of TechnologyCambridgeUSA

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