A New Knowledge Representation Strategy for Cryptographic Protocol Analysis

  • Ivan Cibrario B.
  • Luca Durante
  • Riccardo Sisto
  • Adriano Valenzano
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2619)


The formal verifiation of security properties of a cryptographic protocol is a diffcult, albeit very important task as more and more sensible resources are added to public networks. This paper is focused on model checking; when adopting this approach to the problem, one challenge is to represent the intruder’s knowledge in an effective way. We present an intruder’s knowledge representation strategy that supports the full term language of spi calculus and does not pose arti.- cial restrictions, such as atomicity or limited maximum size, to language elements. In addition, our approach leads to practical implementation because the knowledge representation is incrementally computable and is easily amenable to work with various term representation languages.


Model Check Reduction Rule Natural Deduction Cryptographic Protocol Elimination Rule 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ivan Cibrario B.
    • 1
  • Luca Durante
    • 1
  • Riccardo Sisto
    • 2
  • Adriano Valenzano
    • 1
  1. 1.Istituto di Elettronica e di Ingegneria dell’Informazione e delle Telecomunicazioni c/o Politecnico di TorinoTorinoItaly
  2. 2.Dipartimento di automatica e InformaticaPolitecnico di TorinoTorinoItaly

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