Computer Security from a Programming Language and Static Analysis Perspective

(Extended Abstract of Invited Lecture)
  • Xavier Leroy
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2618)

Abstract

Computer security [16,5] is usually defined as ensuring integrity, confidentiality, and availability requirements even in the presence of a determined, malicious opponent. Sensitive data must be modified and consulted by authorized users only (integrity, confidentiality); moreover, the system should resist “denial of service” attacks that attempt to render it unusable (availability). In more colorful language, computer security has been described as “programming Satan’s computer” [6]: the implementor must assume that every weakness that can be exploited will be.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xavier Leroy
    • 1
  1. 1.INRIA Rocquencourt and Trusted Logic S.A.Le ChesnayFrance

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