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Intrusion-Resilient Public-Key Encryption

  • Yevgeniy Dodis
  • Matt Franklin
  • Jonathan Katz
  • Atsuko Miyaji
  • Moti Yung
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2612)

Abstract

Exposure of secret keys seems to be inevitable, and may in practice represent the most likely point of failure in a cryptographic system. Recently, the notion of intrusion-resilience [17] (which extends both the notions of forward security [3], [5] and key insulation [11]) was proposed as a means of mitigating the harmful effects that key exposure can have. In this model, time is divided into distinct periods; the public key remains fixed throughout the lifetime of the protocol but the secret key is periodically updated. Secret information is stored by both a user and a base; the user performs all cryptographic operations during a given time period, while the base helps the user periodically update his key. Intrusion-resilient schemes remain secure in the face of multiple compromises of both the user and the base, as long as they are not both compromised simultaneously. Furthermore, in case the user and base are compromised simultaneously, prior time periods remain secure (as in forward-secure schemes). Intrusion-resilient signature schemes have been previously constructed [17], [15]. Here, we give the first construction of an intrusion-resilient publickey encryption scheme, based on the recently-constructed forwardsecure encryption scheme of [8]. We also consider generic transformations for securing intrusion-resilient encryption schemes against chosenciphertext attacks.

Keywords

Encryption Scheme Signature Scheme Random Oracle Random Oracle Model Cryptographic Operation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yevgeniy Dodis
    • 1
  • Matt Franklin
    • 2
  • Jonathan Katz
    • 3
  • Atsuko Miyaji
    • 2
    • 4
  • Moti Yung
    • 5
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceNew York UniversityUSA
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of California
  3. 3.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of MarylandCollege Park
  4. 4.Japan Advanced Institute of Science and TechnologyUSA
  5. 5.Department of Computer ScienceColumbia UniversityUSA

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