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Autonomous Nodes and Distributed Mechanisms

  • John C. Mitchell
  • Vanessa Teague
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2609)

Abstract

We extend distributed algorithmic mechanism design by considering a new model that allows autonomous nodes executing a distributed mechanism to strategically deviate from the prescribed protocol. Our goal is to motivate agents to contribute to a global objective and resist disruption by a limited number of malicious irrational agents, augmenting market incentives with cryptographic primitives to make certain forms of behavior computationally infeasible. Several techniques for distributing market computation among autonomous agents are illustrated using a marginal cost mechanism for multicast cost sharing from [3].

Keywords

Malicious Node Multicast Tree Content Provider Link Cost Correct Proof 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • John C. Mitchell
    • 1
  • Vanessa Teague
    • 1
  1. 1.Stanford UniversityStanfordUSA

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