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Verification of Authentication Protocols Based on the Binding Relation

  • Masami Hagiya
  • Ryo Takemura
  • Koichi Takahashi
  • Takamichi Saito
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2609)

Abstract

The correctness of an authentication protocol is based on, among others, the relation between nonces and data that is established in the course of execution of the protocol. In this paper, we formulate an inference system that derives the secrecy of nonces and the relation that binds nonces and data. It is easy to show the correctness of a protocol by directly deriving the binding relation using the inference rules. Depending on situations, it is also possible to extend the inference system by simply adding new inference rules. We give some example protocols whose correctness can only be shown using some conditions on nonces that are formulated as additional inference rules.

Keywords

Inference Rule Authentication Protocol Security Protocol Binding Relation Strand Space 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Masami Hagiya
    • 1
    • 2
  • Ryo Takemura
    • 1
    • 2
  • Koichi Takahashi
    • 1
    • 2
  • Takamichi Saito
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Graduate School of Information Science and TechnologyUniversity of TokyoJapan
  2. 2.National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology Faculty of Science and TechnologyTokyo University of TechnologyJapan

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