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Modifications of ECDSA

  • John Malone-Lee
  • Nigel P. Smart
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 2595)

Abstract

We describe two variants of ECDSA one of which is secure, in the random oracle model, against existential forgery but suffers from the notion of duplicate signatures. The second variant is also secure against existential forgery but we argue that it is likely to possess only four natural duplicate signatures. Our variants of ECDSA are analogous to the variants of DSA as proposed by Brickell et al. However, we show that the ECDSA variants have better exact security properties.

Keywords

Elliptic Curve Signature Scheme Random Oracle Discrete Logarithm Discrete Logarithm Problem 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • John Malone-Lee
    • 1
  • Nigel P. Smart
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of BristolBristolUK

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