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Dominance and Equilibria in the Path Player Game

  • Anita Schöbel
  • Silvia Schwarze
Conference paper
Part of the Operations Research Proceedings book series (ORP, volume 2005)

Summary

This paper investigates the relation between Nash equilibria and non-dominated solutions in a special class of games, namely path player games. Nash equilibria are situations in a game where none of the players is able to obtain a better outcome by himself. On the other hand, a situation is non-dominated if there does not exist a situation which is really better for one of the players, and at least the same for all others. We provide two classes of path player games in which each non-dominated situation is a Nash equilibrium, and one class in which also the reverse is true.

Keywords

Cost Function Nash Equilibrium Game Network Allocation Game Network Resource Allocation 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Anita Schöbel
    • 1
  • Silvia Schwarze
    • 1
  1. 1.University of GöttingenGöttingen

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