An Analysis of a Public Key Protocol with Membranes

  • Olivier Michel
  • Florent Jacquemard
Part of the Natural Computing Series book series (NCS)


We develop an analysis of the Needham-Schroeder public key protocol in the framework of membrane computing. This analysis is used to validate the protocol and exhibits, as expected, a well known logical attack. The novelty of our approach is to use multiset rewriting in a nest of membranes. The use of membranes enables us to make airtight the conditions for detecting an attack. The approach has been validated by developing a full implementation for several versions of the analysis.


Security Protocol Replay Attack Collection Type Cryptographic Protocol Evolution Rule 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Olivier Michel
    • 1
  • Florent Jacquemard
    • 2
  1. 1.LaMI CNRS umr 8042Université d’ÉvryÉvryFrance
  2. 2.INRIA FUTURS and LSV, CNRS umr 8643ENS de CachanCachan CedexFrance

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