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Evolution of Reciprocal Cooperation in the Avatamsaka Game

  • Eizo Akiyama
  • Yuji Aruka
Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 567)

Summary

The Avatamsaka game is investigated both analytically and using computer simulations. The Avatamsaka game is a dependent game in which each agent’s payoff depends completely not on her own decision but on the other players’. Consequently, any combination of mixed strategies is a Nash equilibrium.

Analysis and evolutionary simulations show that the socially optimal state becomes evolutionarily stable by a Pavlovian strategy in the repeated Avatamsaka game, and also in any kind of dependent game. The mechanism of the evolutionary process is investigated from the viewpoint of the agent’s memory and mutation of strategies.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Pure Strategy Memory Size Evolutionary Stable Strategy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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    Aruka, Y. (2001), “Avatamsaka Game Structure and Experiment on the Web,” in Aruka, Y. (ed.), Evolutionary controversies in Economics, Springer, Tokyo, 115–132.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Eizo Akiyama
    • 1
  • Yuji Aruka
    • 2
  1. 1.Institute of Policy and Planning SciencesUniversity of TsukubaTsukuba
  2. 2.Faculty of CommerceChuo UniversityChuo

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