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The Implications of Case-Based Reasoning in Strategic Contexts

  • Luis R. Izquierdo
  • Nicholas M. Gotts
Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 564)

Summary

This paper characterises the transient dynamics and the long-term behaviour of a game theoretical model where players’ decisions at any particular time are guided by a single similar situation they experienced in the past — a simple form of case-based reasoning. The transient dynamics of the model are very dependent on the process by which players learn how to play the game in any given situation. The long-run behaviour of the model varies significantly depending on whether players can occasionally explore different actions or not. When the probability of experimentation is small but non-zero, only a subset of the outcomes that are possible in the absence of experimentation persists in the long-run. In this paper we present some features that characterise such a subset of stochastically stable outcomes.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Game Theory Stable Outcome Social Dilemma Cooperation Rate 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Luis R. Izquierdo
    • 1
  • Nicholas M. Gotts
    • 1
  1. 1.The Macaulay InstituteAberdeenUK

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