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Introduction and Overview

  • David Austen-Smith
  • John Duggan
Part of the Studies in Choice and Welfare book series (WELFARE)

Keywords

Social Choice American Political Science Review Bargaining Model Electoral Competition Pure Strategy Equilibrium 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Austen-Smith
    • 1
  • John Duggan
    • 2
  1. 1.Northwestern UniversityUSA
  2. 2.University of RochesterRochester

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