On the Importance of Public-Key Validation in the MQV and HMQV Key Agreement Protocols

  • Alfred Menezes
  • Berkant Ustaoglu
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4329)

Abstract

HMQV is a hashed variant of the MQV key agreement protocol proposed by Krawczyk at CRYPTO 2005. In this paper, we present some attacks on HMQV and MQV that are successful if public keys are not properly validated. In particular, we present an attack on the two-pass HMQV protocol that does not require knowledge of the victim’s ephemeral private keys. The attacks illustrate the importance of performing some form of public-key validation in Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocols, and furthermore highlight the dangers of relying on security proofs for discrete-logarithm protocols where a concrete representation for the underlying group is not specified.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alfred Menezes
    • 1
  • Berkant Ustaoglu
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Combinatorics & OptimizationUniversity of Waterloo 

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