A Wireless Covert Channel on Smart Cards (Short Paper)

  • Geir Olav Dyrkolbotn
  • Einar Snekkenes
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4307)

Abstract

Microprocessor devices, such as smart cards, are used more and more to store and protect secret information. This development has its advantages, but microprocessor devices are susceptible to various attacks. Much attention has been devoted to side-channel attacks, exploiting unintentional correlation between internal secret information, such as cryptographic keys, and the various side channels. We present a wireless covert channel attack (WCCA) that intentionally correlates secret information with the electromagnetic side channel. WCCA exploits subversive code hidden on all cards during manufacture, to launch an attack, without physical access, when infected cards are used. Experiments on modern smart cards confirm that an insider with the opportunity to hide subversive code can potentially broadcast the card’s internal secrets to a nearby receiver. Security features against side-channel attacks will limit the range but not prevent the attack.

Keywords

Smart Cards EMSide-Channel Subversion Wireless Covert Channel 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Geir Olav Dyrkolbotn
    • 1
  • Einar Snekkenes
    • 1
  1. 1.Norwegian Information Security Lab, Department of Computer Science and Media TechnologyGjovik University CollegeGjovikNorway

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