Extended Sanitizable Signatures

  • Marek Klonowski
  • Anna Lauks
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4296)


Sanitizable signatures introduced by Ateniese et al. is a powerful and fairly practical tool that enables an authorised party called the censor to modify designated parts of a signed message in an arbitrary way without interacting with the signer. In our paper we present several extensions of this paradigm that make sanitizable signatures even more useful. First of all we show how to limit the censor’s abilities to modify mutable parts of a signed message to a predetermined set of strings. In our next proposal we show how to construct a scheme wherein the censor can insert an arbitrary string into a document, but this must be the same string in all designated places. We also present a construction based on a sanitizable signature that allows the censor to present only a constant number of versions of the sanitized message. Another extension provides so-called strong transparency. In this case the verifier does not know which parts of the message could have been modified. Finally, we point out new applications of sanitizable signatures based on combining them with time released cryptography techniques.


Hash Function Signature Scheme Bloom Filter Signed Message Accumulator Technique 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    Ateniese, G., Chou, D.H., de Medeiros, B., Tsudik, G.: Sanitizable signatures. In: di Vimercati, S.d.C., Syverson, P.F., Gollmann, D. (eds.) ESORICS 2005. LNCS, vol. 3679, pp. 159–177. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Ateniese, G., de Medeiros, B.: On the Key Exposure Problem in Chameleon Hashes. In: Blundo, C., Cimato, S. (eds.) SCN 2004. LNCS, vol. 3352, pp. 165–179. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Benaloh, J., de Mare, M.: One-Way Accumulators: A Decentralised Alternative to Digital Signatures. In: Helleseth, T. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1993. LNCS, vol. 765, pp. 274–285. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Bloom, B.H.: Space/time trade-offs in hash coding with allowable errors. Communication of ACM 13(7), 422–426 (1970)zbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Chen, X., Zhang, F., Kim, K.: Chameleon Hashing Without Key Exposure. In: Zhang, K., Zheng, Y. (eds.) ISC 2004. LNCS, vol. 3225, pp. 87–98. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Golle, P., Jakobsson, M., Juels, A., Syverson, P.F.: Universal Re-encryption for Mixnets. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) CT-RSA 2004. LNCS, vol. 2964, pp. 163–178. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    Izu, T., Kanaya, N., Takenaka, M., Yoshioka, T.: PIATS: A Partially Sanitizable Signature Scheme. In: Qing, S., Mao, W., López, J., Wang, G. (eds.) ICICS 2005. LNCS, vol. 3783, pp. 72–83. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Johnson, R., Molnar, D., Song, D.X., Wagner, D.: Homomorphic Signature Schemes. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) CT-RSA 2002. LNCS, vol. 2271, pp. 244–262. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Klonowski, M., Kutyłowski, M., Lauks, A., Zagórski, F.: Conditional Digital Signatures. In: Katsikas, S.K., López, J., Pernul, G. (eds.) TrustBus 2005. LNCS, vol. 3592, pp. 490–497. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Krawczyk, H., Rabin, T.: Chameleon Signatures. In: Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium NDSS 2000, pp. 143–154 (2000)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    May, T.C.: Time-release crypto (February 1993),
  12. 12.
    Micali, S., Rivest, R.L.: Transitive Signature Schemes. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) CT-RSA 2002. LNCS, vol. 2271, pp. 236–243. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Miyazaki, K., Hanaoka, G., Imai, H.: Digitally Signed Document Sanitizing Scheme Based on Bilinear Maps. In: ACM Symposium on InformAtion, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS 2006), Taipei, Taiwan, March 21-24 (2006)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Miyazaki, K., Iwamura, M., Matsumoto, T., Sasaki, R., Yoshiura, H., Tezuka, S., Imai, H.: Digitally Signed Document Sanitizing Scheme with Disclosure Condition Control. The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers (IEICE) Trans. on Fundamentals E88-A(1), 239–246 (2005)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Rivest, R.L.: Two Signatures Schemes, Slides from talk given at Cambridge University, October 17 (2000),
  16. 16.
    Rivest, R.L., Shamir, A., Wagner, D.A.: Time-lock puzzles and timed-released Crypto, Revisited version, March 10 (1996),
  17. 17.
    Steinfeld, R., Bull, L., Zheng, Y.: Content Extraction Signatures. In: Kim, K.-c. (ed.) ICISC 2001. LNCS, vol. 2288, pp. 285–304. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marek Klonowski
    • 1
  • Anna Lauks
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Mathematics and Computer ScienceWrocław University of TechnologyWrocławPoland

Personalised recommendations