Computational Secrecy by Typing for the Pi Calculus

  • Martín Abadi
  • Ricardo Corin
  • Cédric Fournet
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/11924661_16

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4279)
Cite this paper as:
Abadi M., Corin R., Fournet C. (2006) Computational Secrecy by Typing for the Pi Calculus. In: Kobayashi N. (eds) Programming Languages and Systems. APLAS 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4279. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We define and study a distributed cryptographic implementation for an asynchronous pi calculus. At the source level, we adapt simple type systems designed for establishing formal secrecy properties. We show that those secrecy properties have counterparts in the implementation, not formally but at the level of bitstrings, and with respect to probabilistic polynomial-time active adversaries. We rely on compilation to a typed intermediate language with a fixed scheduling strategy. While we exploit interesting, previous theorems for that intermediate language, our result appears to be the first computational soundness theorem for a standard process calculus with mobile channels.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Martín Abadi
    • 1
    • 2
  • Ricardo Corin
    • 1
    • 3
  • Cédric Fournet
    • 1
  1. 1.Microsoft Research 
  2. 2.University of CaliforniaSanta Cruz
  3. 3.University of Twente 

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