Various selection processes are present in the real world. Among them, some processes are open to everyone and others allow only members to validate them. These choice and selection types have been developed using cryptography protocol model. But, further study of definite anonymous secure selection protocols based on a cryptography is needed. In this paper, we propose the ’Intelligent Magic Sticker’ scheme which is anonymous secure selection to get the anonymity of an originator, and which blinds the selection result from other entities on the open network. Because this approach protects a selection result of an originator using one-way anonymous authentication service, although the selection information is opened, the Magic Sticker scheme can be used in electronic voting, fair E-money and electronic bidding etc.


Anonymous Secure Selection Intelligent Magic Sticker Anonymous Authentication 


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    Viswanathan, K., Boyd, C., Dawson, E.: Secure Selection protocols. In: Song, J.S. (ed.) ICISC 1999. LNCS, vol. 1787, pp. 117–131. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Zheng, Y.: Signcyprtion and Its Application in Efficient Public Key Solutions. In: Proc. ISW 1997. LNCS, vol. 1397, pp. 291–312. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Chaum, D.: Elections with Unconditionally-Secret Ballots and Disruption Equivalent to Breaking RSA. In: Günther, C.G. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1988. LNCS, vol. 330, pp. 177–182. Springer, Heidelberg (1988)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Cohen, J., Fischer, M.: A Roubust and Verifiable Cryptographically Secure Election Scheme. In: Proceedings of the 26th Annual IEEE symposium on the Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 372–382 (1985)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Koyama, K.: Secure Secret Voting System Using the RSA Public-Key Cryptosystem. IEICE Trans. J68-D (11), 19556-1965 (1985)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Benaloh, J.: Secret Sharing Homomorphism: Keeping shares of a Secret, Advances in Cryptology. In: Proceedings of Crypto 1986, pp. 251–260 (1986)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Benaloh, J.: Verifiable secret-ballot elections, Ph.D.thesis, Yale university, Technical report 561 (1987)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Bennaloh, J., Yung, M.: Distributing the Power of a Government to Enhance the Privacy of Voters. In: Proceedings of the 5th ACM Symposium on the Principles in distributed Computing, pp. 53–62 (1986)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Benaloh, J., Tuinstra, D.: Receipt Free Secret Ballot Elections. In: Proceedings of the 26th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pp. 544–553 (1994)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Chaum, D.: Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses, and Digital Pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM 24(2), 84–88 (1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Asano, T., Matsumoto, T., Imai, H.: A Scheme for fair Electronic Secret Voting, technical Report, IEICE Japan, ISEC 90–35, pp.21–31 (1990)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Park, C., Itoh, K., Kurosawa, K.: Efficient Anonymous Channel and All/Nothing Election Scheme. In: Helleseth, T. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1993. LNCS, vol. 765, pp. 248–259. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Sako, K., Kilian, J.: Secure Voting Using Partially Compatible Homo -morphisms. In: Advances in Cryptology, Proceedings of Cryto 1994, pp. 411–424 (1994)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Sako, K., Kilian, J.: Receipt-Free Mix-Type Voting Scheme. In: Guillou, L.C., Quisquater, J.-J. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 1995. LNCS, vol. 921, pp. 393–403. Springer, Heidelberg (1995)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Niemi, V., Renvall, A.: How to prevent buying of votes in computer elections. In: ASIACrypto 1994, pp. 164–170 (1994)Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Chaum, D.: Blind Signature for Untraceable Payments, Advances in Cryptology, In: Proceedings of CRYPTO 1982, pp.199–203 (1982)Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Iversen, K.: A Cryptographic Scheme for Computerized General Elections. In: Feigenbaum, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 1991. LNCS, vol. 576, pp. 405–419. Springer, Heidelberg (1992)Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Akiyama, M., Tanaka, Y., Kikuchi, T., Uji, H.: Secret ballot Systems Using Cryptography. IEICE Trans. J67-A(12), 1278–1285 (1984)Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Ohta, K.: An Electrical Voting Scheme Using a Single administrator, 1998 Spring National Convention Record, IEICE, A-294 (1988)Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    He, Z., Su, Z.: A new practical secure e-voting scheme. In: IFIP/SEC 1998 14th International Information Security Conference (1998)Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Schoenmakers, B.: A Simple Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme and Its Application to Electronic Voting. In: Wiener, M.J. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 148–164. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    Park, H.U., Lee, I.Y.: A Study on Preventing from Buying of Votes on Electronic elections. In: Proceedings of The 9th KIPS Spring Conference, vol. 5(1) (1998)Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Park, H.U., Oh, H.G., Lee, I.Y.: A Study on The Protocol of Detection Illegal Act for Central Tabulating Agency. In: Proceedings of The 1th Korea Multimedia Society Spring Conference, vol. 1(1), pp. 163–168 (1998)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hee-Un Park
    • 1
  • Dong-Myung Shin
    • 1
  1. 1.Korea Information Security AgencySeoulKorea

Personalised recommendations