Algorithms for Distributed Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions

  • Muralidhar V. Narumanchi
  • José M. Vidal
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3937)


The problem of optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions consists of finding the set of bids that maximize the revenue for the sellers. Various solutions exist for solving this problem but they are all centralized. That is, they assume that all bids are sent to a centralized auctioneer who then determines the winning set of bids. In this paper we introduce the problem of distributed winner determination in combinatorial auctions which eliminates the centralized auctioneer. We present a set of distributed search-based algorithms for solving this problem and study their relative tradeoffs.


Combinatorial Auction Feasible Allocation Stochastic Local Search Winner Determination Winner Determination Problem 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Muralidhar V. Narumanchi
    • 1
  • José M. Vidal
    • 1
  1. 1.Computer Science and EngineeringUniversity of South CarolinaColumbiaUSA

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