Using the agent based simulation model Sociodynamica, I explore the effect of various intensities of feelings of shame in cementing social bonds that affect the aggregate health (average longevity of agents) and wealth (GDP) of two artificial societies: A primitive society with no division of labor, and a monetized society with division of labor for three different tasks. The results show that agents who feel shame are successful in colonizing virtual societies, but the effect of shame in achieving cooperation differs between both societies studied They results also show that small levels of shame are better in enhancing social cohesion than large costs imposed with altruistic punishment.


Social Cohesion Altruistic Behavior Social Investment Simulation Show Fatal Accident 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Klaus Jaffe
    • 1
  1. 1.Universidad Simón BolivarCaracasVenezuela

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