Diverging Keys in Wireless Sensor Networks

  • Michał Ren
  • Tanmoy Kanti Das
  • Jianying
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4176)


Currently, the most popular ways of dealing with the key distribution problem in sensor networks are random predistribution schemes. For relaxed, realistic assumptions about the attacker, the key infection protocol [1] is also available. In this paper, by accepting the relaxed assumptions from [1], we propose a scheme which makes pairwise keys “drift” or diverge, which enhances security and can be used as a key distribution method. The most notable feature of this scheme is that, under some assumptions about the sensor nodes, it incurs no communication overhead at all.


Sensor Network Security Node Compromise Attack Diverging Keys 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michał Ren
    • 1
  • Tanmoy Kanti Das
    • 2
  • Jianying
    • 2
  1. 1.Adam Mickiewicz UniversityPoznańPoland
  2. 2.Systems & Security Department, Institute for Infocomm ResearchSingapore

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