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LSTOP: A Light-Weight Scalable Truthful Routing Protocol in MANETs with Selfish Nodes

  • Yongwei Wang
  • Mukesh Singhal
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4104)

Abstract

We introduce Light-weight Scalable Truthful rOuting Protocol (LSTOP) for selfish nodes problem in mobile ad hoc networks where a node may use different cost to send packets to different neighbors. LSTOP is a truthful and scalable routing protocol. It incurs an overhead of O(n 2) in the worst case and only O(n) on the average, a substantial improvement over a recently proposed truthful routing protocol, which incurs an overhead of O(n 3). LSTOP encourages nodes’ cooperation by rewarding nodes for their forwarding service according to their cost and provides near-least-cost paths and even least paths with high probability in dense networks. We show the truthfulness of LSTOP and present results from an extensive simulation study to evaluate the performance of our protocol. Simulation results show that LSTOP approaches optimal (cost) routing, provides significantly higher packet delivery ratio, generates significantly lower control overhead, lower end-to-end delay and has better overpayment ratio compared to ad hoc-VCG.

Keywords

Routing Protocol Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) Selfish Nodes Truthfulness the VCG Mechanism 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yongwei Wang
    • 1
  • Mukesh Singhal
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of KentuckyLexingtonUSA

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