Fingercasting—Joint Fingerprinting and Decryption of Broadcast Messages

  • André Adelsbach
  • Ulrich Huber
  • Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4058)

Abstract

We propose a stream cipher that provides confidentiality, traceability and renewability in the context of broadcast encryption. We prove it to be as secure as the generic pseudo-random sequence on which it operates. This encryption scheme, termed fingercasting scheme, achieves joint decryption and fingerprinting of broadcast messages in such a way that an adversary cannot separate both operations or prevent them from happening simultaneously. The scheme is a combination of a broadcast encryption scheme, a fingerprinting scheme and an encryption scheme inspired by the Chameleon cipher. It is the first to provide a formal security proof and a non-constant lower bound for resistance against collusion of malicious users i.e., a minimum number of content copies needed to remove all fingerprints. The scheme is efficient and includes parameters that allow, for example, to trade-off storage size for computation cost at the receiving end.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • André Adelsbach
    • 1
  • Ulrich Huber
    • 1
  • Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
    • 1
  1. 1.Horst Görtz Institute for IT SecurityRuhr-Universität BochumGermany

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