Atomic Routing Games on Maximum Congestion

  • Costas Busch
  • Malik Magdon-Ismail
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4041)


We study atomic routing games on networks in which players choose a path with the objective of minimizing the maximum congestion along the edges of their path. The social cost is the global maximum congestion over all edges in the network. We show that the price of stability is 1. The price of anarchy, PoA, is determined by topological properties of the network. In particular, PoA = O(ℓ+ logn), where ℓ is the length of the longest path in the player strategy sets, and n is the size of the network. Further, κ– 1 ≤PoAc (κ 2 + log2 n), where κ is the length of the longest cycle in the network, and c is a constant.


Nash Equilibrium Social Cost Pure Strategy Network Congestion Congestion Game 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Costas Busch
    • 1
  • Malik Magdon-Ismail
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Computer ScienceRensselaer Polytechnic InstituteTroyUSA

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