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Covert Channels in IPv6

  • Norka B. Lucena
  • Grzegorz Lewandowski
  • Steve J. Chapin
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3856)

Abstract

A covert channel is a communication path that allows transferring information in a way that violates a system security policy. Because of their concealed nature, detecting and preventing covert channels are obligatory security practices. In this paper, we present an examination of network storage channels in the Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6). We introduce and analyze 22 different covert channels. In the appendix, we define three types of active wardens, stateless, stateful, and network-aware, who differ in complexity and ability to block the analyzed covert channels.

Keywords

covert channel IPv6 active warden stateless stateful IPsec 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Norka B. Lucena
    • 1
  • Grzegorz Lewandowski
    • 1
  • Steve J. Chapin
    • 1
  1. 1.Syracuse UniversitySyracuseUSA

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