Kleptographic Attacks on E-Voting Schemes
We analyze electronic voting schemes and show that in many cases it is quite easy to implement a kleptographic channel, which is a profound danger for electronic voting systems. We show serious problems with Neff’s scheme. We present also attacks on Chaum’s visual voting scheme and some related schemes, which work at least when implementation is not careful enough.
Keywordskleptography electronic voting receipt voting coercion election integrity verifiable pseudo-randomness
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