Fault Cryptanalysis and the Shrinking Generator

  • Marcin Gomułkiewicz
  • Mirosław Kutyłowski
  • Paweł Wlaź
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/11764298_6

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4007)
Cite this paper as:
Gomułkiewicz M., Kutyłowski M., Wlaź P. (2006) Fault Cryptanalysis and the Shrinking Generator. In: Àlvarez C., Serna M. (eds) Experimental Algorithms. WEA 2006. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 4007. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

We present two efficient and simple fault attacks on the shrinking generator. In a first case if the attacker can stop control generator for some small number of steps and observe the output, then with high probability he can deduce the full control sequence, and so the other input bitstream. The second method assumes that the attacker can disturb the control sequence (in an unpredictable and random way) and observe many samples of such experiments. Then he can reconstruct a certain sequence that agrees with the input sequence of the generator on a large fraction of bits.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Marcin Gomułkiewicz
    • 1
  • Mirosław Kutyłowski
    • 1
  • Paweł Wlaź
    • 2
  1. 1.Wrocław University of Technology 
  2. 2.Lublin University of Technology 

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