Advertisement

The Cramer-Shoup Encryption Scheme Is Plaintext Aware in the Standard Model

  • Alexander W. Dent
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 4004)

Abstract

In this paper we examine the notion of plaintext awareness as it applies to hybrid encryption schemes. We apply this theory to the Cramer-Shoup hybrid scheme acting on fixed length messages and deduce that the Cramer-Shoup scheme is plaintext-aware in the standard model. This answers a previously open conjecture of Bellare and Palacio on the existence of fully plaintext-aware encryption schemes.

Keywords

Encryption Scheme Turing Machine Encryption Algorithm Security Parameter Oracle Query 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. 1.
    Bellare, M., Desai, A., Jokipii, E., Rogaway, P.: A concrete security treatment of symmetric encryption. In: Proceedings of the 38th Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science. IEEE, Los Alamitos (1997)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Bellare, M., Desai, A., Pointcheval, D., Rogaway, P.: Relations among notions of security for public-key encryption schemes. In: Krawczyk, H. (ed.) CRYPTO 1998. LNCS, vol. 1462, pp. 26–45. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. 3.
    Bellare, M., Palacio, A.: The knowledge-of-exponent assumptions and 3-round zero-knowledge protocols. In: Franklin, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2004. LNCS, vol. 3152, pp. 273–289. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Bellare, M., Palacio, A.: Towards plaintext-aware public-key encryption without random oracles. In: Lee, P.J. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3329, pp. 48–62. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Cramer, R., Shoup, V.: Design and analysis of practical public-key encryption schemes secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. SIAM Journal on Computing 33(1), 167–226 (2004)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Damård, I.B.: Towards practical public key systems secure against chosen ciphertext attacks. In: Feigenbaum, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 1991. LNCS, vol. 576, pp. 445–456. Springer, Heidelberg (1992)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Dent, A.W., Mitchell, C.J.: User’s Guide to Cryptography and Standards. Artech House (2005)Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Hada, S., Tanaka, T.: On the existence of 3-round zero-knowledge protocols. In: Krawczyk, H. (ed.) CRYPTO 1998. LNCS, vol. 1462, pp. 408–423. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Krawczyk, H.: HMQV: A high-performance secure Diffie-Hellman protocol. In: Shoup, V. (ed.) CRYPTO 2005. LNCS, vol. 3621, pp. 546–566. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Naor, M.: On cryptographic assumptions and challenges. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 96–109. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Petrank, E., Rackoff, C.: CBC MAC for real-time data sources. Journal of Cryptography 13(3), 315–339 (2000)MathSciNetzbMATHGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander W. Dent
    • 1
  1. 1.Royal HollowayUniversity of LondonEgham, SurreyU.K.

Personalised recommendations