Efficiency Tradeoffs for Malicious Two-Party Computation

  • Payman Mohassel
  • Matthew Franklin
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3958)


We study efficiency tradeoffs for secure two-party computation in presence of malicious behavior. We investigate two main approaches for defending against malicious behavior in Yao’s garbled circuit method: (1) Committed-input scheme, (2) Equality-checker scheme. We provide asymptotic and concrete analysis of communication and computation costs of the designed protocols. We also develop a weaker definition of security (k-leaked model) for malicious two-party computation that allows for disclosure of some information to a malicious party. We design more efficient variations of Yao’s protocol that are secure in the proposed model.


secure two-party computation secure function evaluation Yao’s garbled circuit malicious adversary 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Payman Mohassel
    • 1
  • Matthew Franklin
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of CaliforniaDavisUSA

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