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Virtual Playgrounds for Worm Behavior Investigation

  • Xuxian Jiang
  • Dongyan Xu
  • Helen J. Wang
  • Eugene H. Spafford
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3858)

Abstract

To detect and defend against Internet worms, researchers have long hoped to have a safe convenient environment to unleash and run real-world worms for close observation of their infection, damage, and propagation. However, major challenges exist in realizing such “worm playgrounds”, including the playgrounds’ fidelity, confinement, scalability, as well as convenience in worm experiments. In this paper, we present a virtualization-based platform to create virtual worm playgrounds, called vGrounds, on top of a physical infrastructure. A vGround is an all-software virtual environment dynamically created for a worm attack. It has realistic end-hosts and network entities, all realized as virtual machines (VMs) and confined in a virtual network (VN). The salient features of vGround include: (1) high fidelity supporting real worm codes exploiting real vulnerable services, (2) strict confinement making the real Internet totally invisible and unreachable from inside a vGround, (3) high resource efficiency achieving sufficiently large scale of worm experiments, and (4) flexible and efficient worm experiment control enabling fast (tens of seconds) and automatic generation, re-installation, and final tear-down of vGrounds. Our experiments with real-world worms (including multi-vector worms and polymorphic worms) have successfully exhibited their probing and propagation patterns, exploitation steps, and malicious payloads, demonstrating the value of vGrounds for worm detection and defense research.

Keywords

Internet Worms Intrusion Observation and Analysis Destructive Experiments 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Xuxian Jiang
    • 1
  • Dongyan Xu
    • 1
  • Helen J. Wang
    • 2
  • Eugene H. Spafford
    • 1
  1. 1.CERIAS and Department of Computer SciencePurdue UniversityWest LafayetteUSA
  2. 2.Microsoft Research RedmondUSA

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