Practical Second-Order DPA Attacks for Masked Smart Card Implementations of Block Ciphers
In this article we describe an improved concept for second-order differential-power analysis (DPA) attacks on masked smart card implementations of block ciphers. Our concept allows to mount second-order DPA attacks in a rather simple way: a second-order DPA attack consists of a pre-processing step and a DPA step. Therefore, our way of performing second-order DPA attacks allows to easily assess the number of traces that are needed for a successful attack. We give evidence on the effectiveness of our methodology by showing practical attacks on a masked AES smart card implementation. In these attacks we target inputs and outputs of the SubBytes operation in the first encryption round.
KeywordsBlock Cipher Power Trace Cryptographic Hardware Encryption Round Output Mask
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