Network Load Games

  • Ioannis Caragiannis
  • Clemente Galdi
  • Christos Kaklamanis
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3827)


We study network load games, a class of routing games in networks which generalize selfish routing games on networks consisting of parallel links. In these games, each user aims to route some traffic from a source to a destination so that the maximum load she experiences in the links of the network she occupies is minimum given the routing decisions of other users. We present results related to the existence, complexity, and price of anarchy of Pure Nash Equilibria for several network load games. As corollaries, we present interesting new statements related to the complexity of computing equilibria for selfish routing games in networks of restricted parallel links.


Social Cost Identical User Parallel Edge Congestion Game Polynomial Time Approximation Scheme 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ioannis Caragiannis
    • 1
  • Clemente Galdi
    • 1
    • 2
  • Christos Kaklamanis
    • 1
  1. 1.Research Academic Computer Technology Institute, Department of Computer Engineering and InformaticsUniversity of PatrasRioGreece
  2. 2.Dipartimento di Informatica ed Applicazioni “R.M. Capocelli”Universitá di SalernoBaronissiItaly

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