Hybrid Voting Protocols and Hardness of Manipulation

  • Edith Elkind
  • Helger Lipmaa
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3827)


This paper addresses the problem of constructing voting protocols that are hard to manipulate. We describe a general technique for obtaining a new protocol by combining two or more base protocols, and study the resulting class of (vote-once) hybrid voting protocols, which also includes most previously known manipulation-resistant protocols. We show that for many choices of underlying base protocols, including some that are easily manipulable, their hybrids are NP-hard to manipulate, and demonstrate that this method can be used to produce manipulation-resistant protocols with unique combinations of useful features.


Original Protocol Hybrid Protocol Preference List Rank Aggregation Winner Determination 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Edith Elkind
    • 1
  • Helger Lipmaa
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of WarwickU.K.
  2. 2.Cybernetica AS and University of TartuEstonia

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