Hybrid Voting Protocols and Hardness of Manipulation
This paper addresses the problem of constructing voting protocols that are hard to manipulate. We describe a general technique for obtaining a new protocol by combining two or more base protocols, and study the resulting class of (vote-once) hybrid voting protocols, which also includes most previously known manipulation-resistant protocols. We show that for many choices of underlying base protocols, including some that are easily manipulable, their hybrids are NP-hard to manipulate, and demonstrate that this method can be used to produce manipulation-resistant protocols with unique combinations of useful features.
KeywordsOriginal Protocol Hybrid Protocol Preference List Rank Aggregation Winner Determination
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 3.Conitzer, V., Sandholm, T.: Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. In: Proceedings of the Eighteenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Fourteenth Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, July 28 — August 1, pp. 314–319. AAAI Press, Menlo Park (2002)Google Scholar
- 4.Conitzer, V., Sandholm, T.: Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. In: Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), Acapulco, Mexico, August 9–15, pp. 781–788 (2003)Google Scholar
- 5.Dwork, C., Kumar, R., Naor, M., Sivakumar, D.: Rank aggregation methods for the Web, In. In: Proc. 10th International World-Wide Web Conference (WWW), pp. 613–622Google Scholar
- 6.Elkind, E., Lipmaa, H.: Small Coalitions Cannot Manipulate Voting. In: Proceedings of Financial Cryptography and Data Security - Ninth International Conference, February 28–March 3, The Commonwealth of Dominica (2005)Google Scholar
- 7.Ephrati, E., Rosenschein, J.S.: Multi-Agent Planning as a Dynamic Search for Social Consensus. In: Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI (1993)Google Scholar
- 9.Fagin, R., Kumar, R., Mahdian, M., Sivakumar, D., Vee, E.: Comparing and Aggregating Rankings with Ties. In: Proceedings of 23rd ACM Symposium on Principles of Database Systems (PODS), pp. 47–58Google Scholar
- 10.Pennock, D.M., Horvitz, E., Lee Giles, C.: Social Choice Theory and Recommender Systems: Analysis of the Axiomatic Foundations of Collaborative Filtering. In: Proceedings of the Seventeenth National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (July 2000)Google Scholar
- 11.Satterthwaite, M.A.: The Existence of Strategy-Proof Voting Procedures: A Topic in Social Choice Theory. PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison (1973)Google Scholar