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Partially-Specified Large Games

  • Ehud Kalai
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3828)

Abstract

The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a difficulty in applying it to games which are not fully specified. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. Moreover, they arise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi-anonymous players. The paper describes this condition and its implications.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Mixed Strategy Coordination Game Market Game Large Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ehud Kalai
    • 1
  1. 1.Kellogg School of ManagementNorthwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA

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