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A Simple Characterization for Truth-Revealing Single-Item Auctions

  • Kamal Jain
  • Aranyak Mehta
  • Kunal Talwar
  • Vijay Vazirani
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3828)

Abstract

We give a simple characterization of all single-item truth-revealing auctions under some mild (and natural) assumptions about the auctions. Our work opens up the possibility of using variational calculus to design auctions having desired properties.

Keywords

Rank Function Threshold Function Maximum Rank Variational Calculus Auction Mechanism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kamal Jain
    • 1
  • Aranyak Mehta
    • 2
  • Kunal Talwar
    • 3
  • Vijay Vazirani
    • 2
  1. 1.Microsoft ResearchRedmond
  2. 2.College of ComputingGeorgia Institute of TechnologyAtlantaUSA
  3. 3.Microsoft ResearchSilicon Valley

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