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On the Security of Some Password-Based Key Agreement Schemes

  • Qiang Tang
  • Chris J. Mitchell
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3802)

Abstract

In this paper we show that three potential security vulnerabilities exist in the strong password-only authenticated key exchange scheme due to Jablon. Two standardised schemes based on Jablon’s scheme, namely the first password-based key agreement mechanism in ISO/IEC FCD 11770-4 and the scheme BPKAS-SPEKE in IEEE P1363.2 also suffer from some of these security vulnerabilities. We further show that other password-based key agreement mechanisms, including those in ISO/IEC FCD 11770-4 and IEEE P1363.2, also suffer from these security vulnerabilities. Finally, we propose means to remove these security vulnerabilities.

Keywords

Security Vulnerability Protocol Execution Dictionary Attack Protocol Instance Online Dictionary Attack 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Qiang Tang
    • 1
  • Chris J. Mitchell
    • 1
  1. 1.Information Security GroupRoyal Holloway, University of LondonEgham, SurreyUK

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