Examining Indistinguishability-Based Proof Models for Key Establishment Protocols

  • Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo
  • Colin Boyd
  • Yvonne Hitchcock
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3788)

Abstract

We examine various indistinguishability-based proof models for key establishment protocols, namely the Bellare & Rogaway (1993, 1995), the Bellare, Pointcheval, & Rogaway (2000), and the Canetti & Krawczyk (2001) proof models. We then consider several variants of these proof models, identify several subtle differences between these variants and models, and compare the relative strengths of the notions of security between the models. For each of the pair of relations between the models (either an implication or a non-implication), we provide proofs or counter-examples to support the observed relations. We also reveal a drawback with the original formulation of the Bellare, Pointcheval, & Rogaway (2000) model, whereby the Corrupt query is not allowed.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo
    • 1
  • Colin Boyd
    • 1
  • Yvonne Hitchcock
    • 1
  1. 1.Information Security InstituteQueensland University of TechnologyBrisbaneAustralia

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