Modular Security Proofs for Key Agreement Protocols

  • Caroline Kudla
  • Kenneth G. Paterson
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3788)

Abstract

The security of key agreement protocols has traditionally been notoriously hard to establish. In this paper we present a modular approach to the construction of proofs of security for a large class of key agreement protocols. By following a modular approach to proof construction, we hope to enable simpler and less error-prone analysis and proof generation for such key agreement protocols. The technique is compatible with Bellare-Rogaway style models as well as the more recent models of Bellare et al. and Canetti and Krawczyk. In particular, we show how the use of a decisional oracle can aid the construction of proofs of security for this class of protocols and how the security of these protocols commonly reduces to some form of Gap assumption.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Caroline Kudla
    • 1
  • Kenneth G. Paterson
    • 1
  1. 1.Information Security GroupRoyal Holloway, University of LondonUK

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