An Options-Based Method to Solve the Composability Problem in Sequential Auctions

  • Adam I. Juda
  • David C. Parkes
Conference paper

DOI: 10.1007/11575726_4

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3435)
Cite this paper as:
Juda A.I., Parkes D.C. (2006) An Options-Based Method to Solve the Composability Problem in Sequential Auctions. In: Faratin P., Rodríguez-Aguilar J.A. (eds) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI. Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems. AMEC 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3435. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

Abstract

Current auctions often expose bidding agents to two difficult, yet common, problems. First, bidding agents often have the opportunity to participate in successive auctions selling the same good, with no dominant bidding strategy in any single auction. Second, bidding agents often need to acquire a bundle of goods by bidding in multiple auctions, again with no dominant bidding strategy in any single auction. This paper introduces an options-based infrastructure that respects the autonomy of individual sellers but still enables bidders to utilize a dominant, truthful strategy across multiple auctions.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  • Adam I. Juda
    • 1
  • David C. Parkes
    • 1
  1. 1.Division of Engineering and Applied SciencesHarvard UniversityCambridgeUSA

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