On the Rôle of Abstract Non-interference in Language-Based Security

  • Isabella Mastroeni
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3780)

Abstract

In this paper, we illustrate the rôle of the notion of Abstract Non-Interference in language based security, by explaining how it models both the weakening of attackers’ observational capability, and the declassification of private information. Namely, we show that in abstract non-interference we model both attackers that can only observe properties of public data, and private properties that can or cannot flow. Moreover, we deepen the understanding of abstract non-interference by comparing it, by means of examples, with some the most interesting approaches to the weakening of non-interference, such as the PER model, robust declassification, delimited release and relaxed non-interference.

Keywords

Language-based Security Non-Interference Declassification 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Isabella Mastroeni
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computing and Information Sciences – Kansas State UniversityManhattanUSA

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