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Justification of Smart Sensors for Nuclear Applications

  • Peter Bishop
  • Robin Bloomfield
  • Sofia Guerra
  • Kostas Tourlas
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3688)

Abstract

This paper describes the results of a research study sponsored by the UK nuclear industry into methods of justifying smart sensors. Smart sensors are increasingly being used in the nuclear industry; they have potential benefits such as greater accuracy and better noise filtering, and in many cases their analogue counterparts are no longer manufactured. However, smart sensors (as it is the case for most COTS) are sold as black boxes despite the fact that their safety justification might require knowledge of their internal structure and development process. The study covered both management aspects of interacting with manufacturers to obtain the information needed, and the technical aspects of designing an appropriate safety justification approach and assessing feasibility of a range of technical analyses. The analyses performed include the methods we presented at Safecomp 2002 and 2003.

Keywords

Vulnerability Assessment Nuclear Industry Malicious Code Assembler Code Smart Sensor 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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    Bishop, P.G., Bloomfield, R.E., Froome, P.K.D.: Justifying the use of software of uncertain pedigree (SOUP) in safety-related applications. Report No: CRR336 HSE Books (2001), ISBN 0 7176 2010 7, http://www.hse.gov.uk/research/crr_pdf/2001/crr01336.pdf
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Bishop
    • 1
    • 2
  • Robin Bloomfield
    • 1
    • 2
  • Sofia Guerra
    • 2
  • Kostas Tourlas
    • 2
  1. 1.CSRCity University 
  2. 2.AdelardLondonUK

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