Making Chord Robust to Byzantine Attacks

  • Amos Fiat
  • Jared Saia
  • Maxwell Young
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 3669)

Abstract

Chord is a distributed hash table (DHT) that requires only O(log n) links per node and performs searches with latency and message cost O(log n), where n is the number of peers in the network. Chord assumes all nodes behave according to protocol. We give a variant of Chord which is robust with high probability for any time period during which: 1) there are always at least z total peers in the network for some integer z; 2) there are never more than (1/4–ε)z Byzantine peers in the network for a fixed ε > 0; and 3) the number of peer insertion and deletion events is no more than zk for some tunable parameter k. We assume there is an adversary controlling the Byzantine peers and that the IP-addresses of all the Byzantine peers and the locations where they join the network are carefully selected by this adversary. Our notion of robustness is rather strong in that we not only guarantee that searches can be performed but also that we can enforce any set of “proper behavior” such as contributing new material, etc. In comparison to Chord, the resources required by this new variant are only a polylogarithmic factor greater in communication, messaging, and linking costs.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  • Amos Fiat
    • 1
  • Jared Saia
    • 2
  • Maxwell Young
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceTel Aviv UniversityTel AvivIsrael
  2. 2.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity of New MexicoAlbuquerqueUSA

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